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*
 
Andrea Guardo 
 
Sharon Street (2008, p. 223) defines constructivism about practical reasons as the 
view that: 
 
[…] the fact that X is a reason to Y for agent A is constituted by the fact that 
the judgment that X is a reason to Y (for A) withstands scrutiny from the 
standpoint of A’s other judgments about reasons.1 
 
This is, of course, a subjectivist view, since it has that whether X is a reason to Y 
for A depends on A’s normative point of view (see, e.g., Street 2008, p. 219), on 
what A – as a matter of fact – values.2 However, different brands of constructiv-
ism are subjectivist to different degrees (see, e.g., Street 2016, § 2 and 2008, pp. 
243-244). According to Korsgaard’s (e.g. 1996) Kantian constructivism, for in-
stance, even though the truth value of a judgment about practical reasons always 
depends on the agent’s normative point of view, there are certain – moral – judg-
ments which are true relative to every possible normative point of view; this is not 
objectivity, but it is at least a very strong form of intersubjectivity. On the other 
hand, Humean constructivists – such as Bernard Williams (e.g. 1979) and Street 
herself – maintain that an unrestricted intersubjectivity is no more attainable than 
real objectivity. An ideally coherent Caligula, who has conclusive reasons to tor-
ture others for fun, is entirely possible (see esp. Street 2009b and 2012, §§ 3-6). In 
Street’s (2010, p. 370) own words: 
 
According to Humean constructivists, similarities in human beings’ reasons 
[…] ultimately depend for their existence on contingent similarities in peo-
ple’s evaluative starting points and circumstances – on the existence of a 
shared human nature […]. 
 
Street’s version of Humean constructivism, however, comes with an important 
qualification, since Street (2016, § 12) has maintained that, in fact, there is one 
conclusion about practical reasons which is entailed from within every possible 
                                                          
*
 I would like to thank Shanna Slank, Elliott Sober, Rowland Stout, Sharon Street, and 
Mike Titelbaum for comments on previous versions of this paper. 
1
 See also the “brief evolutionary thought experiment” of § 5. Note that this kind of view 
bears a strong analogy to Stanley’s (2005) interest-relative invariantism about knowledge 
in that it has that the relevant standpoint is the agent’s; Street argues for this in her 2008, 
p. 224 – on this issue see also Prinz 2007, §§ 5.1.2-5.1.3 and Schafer 2014. 
2
 For the attitude of valuing see Street 2012, § 2. 
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normative point of view, namely the constructivist thesis itself. Therefore, Street’s 
Humean constructivism has, as it were, a Kantian basis.
3
 Or at least so Street has 
maintained. 
In the first part of the paper (sections 1 and 2) I argue that the Kantian basis 
thesis is inconsistent with another tenet of Street’s, namely that the constructivist 
thesis holds also in the domain of epistemic reasons.
4
 Since I find Street’s case for 
constructivism about epistemic reasons quite convincing, I take this to be strong 
evidence against the notion that constructivism about practical reasons is entailed 
from within every possible normative point of view. This raises some interesting 
questions. Street uses the Kantian basis thesis to argue that realists about practical 
reasons can be proved wrong employing only assumptions they themselves are 
committed to. She also uses the thesis to answer the worry that constructivism, if 
true, would be trivial. What happens to these arguments if the Kantian basis thesis 
is, as I argue, false? This is the topic of the second part of the paper (sections 3 
and 4). 
The paper’s main thesis is that Street’s overall position is internally incon-
sistent. A (Humean) constructivist about epistemic reasons cannot consistently 
claim that there are normative truths which are entailed from within every possi-
ble normative point of view. This inconsistency can be dealt with either by aban-
doning constructivism about epistemic reasons or by accepting that there are no 
normative truths which are entailed from within every possible normative point of 
view. I myself favor the latter option and the second part of the paper is, in fact, a 
discussion of the consequences of embracing it. However, proving that this is the 
right way to deal with the inconsistency in question falls outside the scope of the 
paper, which means that what I say in the last two sections is conditional on the 
assumption that epistemic normativity can be made sense of along constructivist 
lines. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for Street’s empirical assumptions about 
the etiology of our normative beliefs: I think they are justified, but I will not argue 
for the point, and so the paper as a whole is conditional on the assumption that 
they can be satisfactorily defended. 
 
1. The Kantian Basis Thesis 
When Street says that constructivism about practical reasons is entailed from 
within every possible normative point of view, what she has in mind is that a cer-
tain argument for constructivism, her Darwinian Dilemma, is sound relative to 
                                                          
3
 For another sense in which Street’s Humean constructivism is Kantian see her 2008, pp. 
244-245. 
4
 Note that Street (2009a, § 3) distinguishes, I think correctly, between the concept of an 
epistemic reason and that of a reason for belief. An epistemic reason is a reason to believe 
that p that tells in favor of the truth of p. 
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every possible normative point of view (see Street 2016, § 12). Therefore, the best 
way to show that the Kantian basis thesis is inconsistent with constructivism about 
epistemic reasons is by showing that given constructivism about epistemic rea-
sons, there are possible normative points of view relative to which the Darwinian 
Dilemma is unsound. This is the strategy that I will pursue in this and the next 
section. 
Let us start with the Darwinian Dilemma. The first thing to note is that it comes 
in different versions, each one focusing on a different metaethical alternative, but 
each one trying to show – by means of different elaborations of the same evolu-
tionary core – that a proponent of the metaethical view in question has very strong 
reasons to abandon it in favor of some form of constructivism. For simplicity’s 
sake, here I will focus on the version which deals with what has come to be 
known as non-natural realism:
5
 
 
Non-Natural Realism: there are objective irreducibly normative truths (see, 
e.g., Enoch 2011, pp. 3-4 and Street 2006, § 2 and 2010, § 5). 
 
Here is (a somewhat sketchy version of) the argument. Let Shanna be a non-
natural realist about practical reasons. This means that Shanna disagrees with the 
constructivist about the status of practical normativity. However, Shanna and the 
constructivist agree in most of their first-order judgments about what people have 
reasons to do – they agree that the fact that the chocolate cookies I ate this morn-
ing were delicious was a reason, even though maybe not a conclusive one, for me 
to eat them all, and so on. What is most important, though, is that Shanna and the 
constructivist also agree about the following non-normative claim: 
 
Evolutionary Theory: “[…] the forces of natural selection have had a tre-
mendous influence on the content of human evaluative judgments” (Street 
2006, p. 113).
6
 
                                                          
5
 For the version focusing on natural realism see Street 2006, § 7, for that dealing with 
quasi-realism see Street 2011. 
6
 For a nice discussion of the point see Street 2006, § 4. For a defense of the use of genea-
logical considerations see Street 2015, §§ 1-2. For a useful taxonomy of the ways in 
which natural selection may have influenced our evaluative judgments see Joyce 2006, 
chapter 1, but keep in mind that such taxonomical issues are controversial – see, e.g., So-
ber and Wilson’s (1998, pp. 79-86) discussion of the relation between group selection 
models (for which see, e.g., Sober and Wilson 1998, chapter 1) and evolutionary game 
theory models (for which see, e.g., Axelrod 1984, chapter 5). For the role of cultural evo-
lution see Boyd and Richerson 2005, part 3. Finally, it is worth stressing that the empiri-
cal assumptions of Street’s argument are weaker than one might think (see Street 2006, p. 
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The question is: what can Shanna say about the relation between these selective 
forces and the objective irreducibly normative truths she posits? 
The first option is to deny that there is any relation: 
 
The No-Relation View: there is no relation between the selective forces that 
shaped our evaluative judgments and the objective irreducibly normative 
truths about practical reasons. 
 
Is this a satisfactory position? Street (2006, § 5) thinks not. Here is her first point: 
 
The key point to see about this option is that if one takes it, then the forces 
of natural selection must be viewed as a purely distorting influence on our 
evaluative judgments, having pushed us in evaluative directions that have 
nothing whatsoever to do with the evaluative truth. […] every now and then, 
Darwinian pressures might have happened to push us toward accepting an 
evaluative judgment that accords with one of the realist’s independent eval-
uative truths. But this would be purely a matter of chance […]. We have 
thus been guided by the wrong sort of influence from the very outset of our 
evaluative history, and so, more likely than not, most of our evaluative 
judgments have nothing to do with the truth (Street 2006, pp. 121-122). 
 
That is: if you accept Non-Natural Realism, Evolutionary Theory, and the No-
Relation view, then you should conclude that it is very likely that most of our 
evaluative judgments have nothing to do with the truth.
7, 8
 But that ‒ and this is 
Street’s second point ‒ would mean embracing quite a radical form of skepticism 
about our knowledge of what we have reason to do, or not to do (see Street 2006, 
p. 122) ‒ an extremely unattractive position which, according to Street (2015, § 
                                                                                                                                                               
155): for one, the relevant traits do not have to be directly selected – for the distinction 
direct-indirect selection see Okasha 2006, p. 25 and Sober 2000, p. 83, which uses “selec-
tion for” and “selection of”; for another, one can accept the notion that our normative 
judgments are the product of evolution without embracing the evolutionary psychology 
research program in the mainstream version popularized by Pinker 1997, which is con-
troversial (see, e.g., Buller 2005). 
7
 Street says that it is “more likely than not” that most of our evaluative judgments have 
nothing to do with the truth. I take the context to make clear that the intended claim is ac-
tually stronger: the probability in question is close to 1. 
8
 Slightly different readings of the passage are possible. All the available alternative read-
ings, however, have Street making, at some point of her argument, a normative assump-
tion ‒ which is all that matters for the purposes of this paper. 
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5), can be discarded out of hand. And since this skepticism is a consequence of 
the No-Relation View, this suggests that such a view cannot be taken too serious-
ly. 
The transition from the undeniable lack of appeal of the aforementioned skep-
ticism to the notion that we can assume it ‒ and, therefore, the No-Relation View 
which leads to it ‒ to be false is not as smooth as Street makes it out to be. The 
notion that there are objective, but in a certain sense unknowable, irreducibly 
normative truths about practical reasons is, no doubt, at the very least a coherent 
one; and it is not clear why the fact that such a notion is unattractive should count 
as evidence that it is false. However, consistently with the nature of my goals in 
this paper and the general attitude toward Street’s assumptions that I embraced 
above, in what follows I will bracket these worries. 
The point I do want to stress is that ‒ when she says that if you accept Non-
Natural Realism, Evolutionary Theory, and the No-Relation view, then you 
should conclude that it is very likely that most of our evaluative judgments have 
nothing to do with the truth ‒ Street is making a claim about what a person who 
accepts certain assumptions should believe. For ease of reference, in what follows 
I will refer to this claim as “the Cliffordian Principle” (see Clifford 1877). 
Let us now turn to Shanna’s second option, which is to admit that there is in-
deed a relation between the workings of natural selection and the objective irre-
ducibly normative truths she posits. According to Street (2006, pp. 134-135), such 
a move would commit Shanna to what Street calls “the Tracking Account”: 
 
[…] we may understand these evolutionary causes as having tracked the 
truth […]. As Derek Parfit has put the point: it is possible that “just as chee-
tahs were selected for their speed […] the particular feature for which we 
were selected was our ability to respond to reasons […]” (Street 2006, pp. 
125-126). 
 
But Shanna, being a well-educated 21
st
 century woman, also accepts: 
 
The Usual Criteria of Scientific Adequacy: the competition between differ-
ent scientific hypotheses should be adjudicated focusing on the degree to 
which they instantiate the usual theoretical virtues. 
 
This means that Shanna accepts that the Tracking Account, which puts itself for-
ward as a scientific hypothesis, should be compared to alternative explanations 
focusing on features such as parsimony, clarity, and explanatory power. And here 
lies the problem, because it is not hard to find a hypothesis which exemplifies the 
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usual theoretical virtues to a higher degree than the Tracking Account does (see 
Street 2006, pp. 126-134 and 2011, § 6): 
 
According to what I will call the adaptive link account, tendencies to make 
certain kinds of evaluative judgments rather than others contributed to our 
ancestors’ reproductive success not because they constituted perceptions of 
independent evaluative truths, but rather because they forged adaptive links 
between our ancestors’ circumstances and their responses to those circum-
stances, getting them to act, feel, and believe in ways that turned out to be 
reproductively advantageous (Street 2006, p. 127). 
 
Thus, Shanna has very strong reasons to abandon the Tracking Account and, with 
it, her realism. Indeed, since the Adaptive Link Account is perfectly consistent 
with constructivism (see Street 2006, pp. 152-153), Shanna has very strong rea-
sons to abandon realism in favor of some form of constructivism. 
And so, when Shanna looks at the choice between the No-Relation View and 
the Tracking Account reflectively, what she sees is – in fact – a choice between 
constructivism and an extremely unattractive form of skepticism. And this, Street 
thinks, gives Shanna conclusive reasons to embrace constructivism. This is the 
conclusion of the Darwinian Dilemma. Now the question is: is this argument real-
ly sound relative to every possible normative point of view? 
 
2. The Problem with the Kantian Basis Thesis 
If, as Street (2009a, §§ 6-8) argued, constructivism is the one correct view of epis-
temic reasons, this question must be answered in the negative. As we have seen, 
according to constructivism about practical reasons what reasons an agent A has 
depends on what A, as a matter of fact, values; and if A’s evaluative starting point 
is deviant enough, A’s reasons can be rather different from ours. Likewise, given 
constructivism about epistemic reasons, all it takes for a believer B to have (lack) 
reasons that normal human beings lack (have) is that B’s evaluative starting point 
is deviant enough. In particular, if B’s evaluative starting point is deviant enough, 
it may happen that neither the Cliffordian Principle nor the Usual Criteria of Sci-
entific Adequacy (which are both substantive normative assumptions) are true rel-
ative to B’s normative point of view. Now, let Shannon be such an idiosyncratic 
believer. Since it assumes both the Cliffordian Principle and the Usual Criteria of 
Scientific Adequacy, the Darwinian Dilemma will be unsound relative to Shan-
non’s normative point of view, which means that the Kantian basis thesis is false. 
One might try to resist this conclusion by arguing that Shannon is not a possi-
ble believer, a move which would be the epistemic parallel of Korsgaard’s strate-
gy in the domain of practical reasons. I do not find this line of argument very 
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promising. Let us start with the Cliffordian Principle. This principle says that if 
you accept Non-Natural Realism, Evolutionary Theory, and the No-Relation view, 
then you should conclude that it is very likely that most of our evaluative judg-
ments have nothing to do with the truth ‒ for if Non-Natural Realism, Evolution-
ary Theory, and the No-Relation view are all true, then it is very likely that most 
of our evaluative judgments have nothing to do with the truth. Now, let us say that 
the reason why the Cliffordian Principle, which is a particular principle concern-
ing the normative consequences of the acceptance of certain theses, is false rela-
tive to Shannon’s normative point of view is that, relative to such a point of view, 
the fact that if p1, …, pn are all true then it is very likely that q never entails that if 
you accept p1, …, pn then you should conclude that it is very likely that q. Given 
such an assumption, one can definitely make a case that Shannon’s normative 
point of view is not that of a real believer (see, e.g., Street 2009a, § 5). But this is 
not an assumption that we have to make. We could, for instance, assume that the 
Cliffordian Principle is false relative to Shannon’s normative point of view be-
cause even though, relative to such a point of view, the fact that if p1, …, pn are all 
true then it is very likely that q usually entails that if you accept p1, …, pn then 
you should conclude that it is very likely that q, this is not always the case; let us 
say, for example, that you should not conclude that it is very likely that q if draw-
ing this conclusion would make you severely depressed ‒ and drawing the skepti-
cal conclusion would make Shannon severely depressed.
9
 Given this assumption, 
we can no doubt conclude that Shannon is an extremely peculiar individual, but I 
take it to be clear that accusing her of not being a true believer would be unwar-
ranted. 
That being said, in order for the Darwinian Dilemma to be unsound relative to 
Shannon’s normative point of view the falsity of the Usual Criteria of Scientific 
Adequacy is enough. And in this case a Korsgaard-like move looks even less 
promising. After all, why should we think that Shannon is no believer unless she 
has reasons to adjudicate the competition between different scientific hypotheses 
focusing on the degree to which they instantiate the usual theoretical virtues? The 
very fact that the principle in question deals only with the assessment of scientific 
hypotheses strongly suggests that its truth relative to Shannon’s normative point 
of view cannot be a necessary condition of Shannon’s being a believer. 
And so the Kantian basis thesis is inconsistent with constructivism about epis-
temic reasons. And since I find Street’s argument for the latter quite solid, I think 
that this conclusion gives us very strong reasons to believe the Kantian basis the-
sis to be false. Now, if this is correct, it raises a couple of questions, one concern-
                                                          
9
 Note how different Shannon would be from Ben and the other characters described in 
Street 2009a, § 6. 
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ing the provability of constructivism about practical reasons and another concern-
ing the alleged triviality of this kind of position. I will address these two issues in 
turn. 
 
3. Provability 
Street thinks that one interesting feature of the Kantian basis thesis is that it shows 
that realists about practical reasons can be proved wrong employing only assump-
tions they themselves are committed to. After all, if the Kantian basis thesis were 
true the Darwinian Dilemma would be sound relative to every possible normative 
point of view, and the conclusion of the Darwinian Dilemma is that you have con-
clusive reasons to embrace constructivism. 
However, if the Kantian basis thesis is false, as I have argued we have reasons 
to believe, then there are possible normative points of view relative to which the 
Darwinian Dilemma is unsound and its conclusion false; there are, for example, 
possible normative points of view whose bearers have conclusive reasons to em-
brace non-natural realism together with some version of the Tracking Account. 
These are possible realists who cannot be proved wrong employing only assump-
tions they themselves are committed to. 
Is this a problem? It depends. As for myself, I think that if it is a problem, it is 
not a serious one. Even though there are possible realists who cannot be proved 
wrong employing only assumptions they themselves are committed to, real-life 
realists are very different animals. Relative to their normative point of view, the 
Cliffordian Principle and the Usual Criteria of Scientific Adequacy are no doubt 
true and the Darwinian Dilemma is therefore sound. Humean constructivism has, 
as it were, a quasi-Kantian basis. And as long as Street is interested in convincing 
real-life – rather than merely possible – realists, this is all she needs.10 
 
                                                          
10
 Note that the conclusion of the previous section is that there are possible normative 
points of view whose bearers do not have conclusive reasons to embrace constructivism. 
If, like Street, you take constructivism to be a judgment about practical reasons and, once 
again like Street, you are a constructivist about practical reasons, that conclusion entails 
that there are possible normative points of view relative to which constructivism is not 
true. However, if – say – you reject the notion that constructivism is a judgment about 
practical reasons, the corollary does not follow. And if you are a constructivist about 
practical reasons, you will conclude just that the bearers of the aforementioned possible 
normative points of view have no reason to believe a proposition which, as a matter of 
fact, is true – here it is worth keeping in mind that the possible realists in question have 
no reason to embrace constructivism precisely because in general their reasons depend on 
truth-related considerations less than ours do. And this looks like a hardly problematic 
conclusion. 
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4. Triviality 
Street has argued that the Kantian basis thesis can help us answer certain familiar 
worries concerning, as it were, the triviality of the constructivist position. Consid-
er the following argument: 
 
First premise: if constructivism about practical reasons is true the truth value 
of a judgment about practical reasons is always relative to a normative point 
of view. 
Second premise: constructivism about practical reasons is itself a judgment 
about practical reasons. 
Lemma: if constructivism about practical reasons is true it is true only rela-
tive to a normative point of view. 
Conclusion: if constructivism about practical reasons is true it is trivial; real-
ists can argue that relative to their normative point of view constructivism is 
false and that its truth relative to another normative point of view has no 
grip on them (see Street manuscript, § 10). 
 
If the Kantian basis thesis were true, the conclusion would not follow from the 
lemma, for realists could not argue that relative to their normative point of view 
constructivism is false. After all, if the Kantian basis thesis were true, realists 
themselves would have conclusive reasons to believe that constructivism is true 
(see Street 2016, § 12 and manuscript, § 10). 
Unfortunately, the Kantian basis thesis is likely false. And so, the question is: 
is there any other way for constructivists to rebut the challenge of triviality? As 
far as I can see, here there are two strategies that a constructivist can try to devel-
op. The first option is to rely on the fact that even though it does not have a Kanti-
an basis, Humean constructivism has a quasi-Kantian basis. This means that even 
if there are possible realists who can argue that relative to their normative point of 
view constructivism is false, no real-life realist is like that.
11
 This is definitely 
something. That being said, I think we can do better. Here is, then, the construc-
tivist’s second option. 
Let us start by noting that, of the two premises of our argument, the key one is 
the second, namely the claim that constructivism about practical reasons is itself a 
judgment about practical reasons. This is an idea I introduced, without any discus-
sion, when I first introduced the Kantian basis thesis. It is now time to focus on it 
and try to make clear why Street believes it is true. The best way to do this is, I 
                                                          
11
 When I discussed the problem with Street, this was the route she was inclined to go. A 
couple of promissory notes (notes 25 and 27) in the most recent version I have seen of 
Street manuscript suggest that she still feels that way. 
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think, to start with Street’s view of the disagreement between constructivists and 
realists. 
A somewhat plausible interpretation of the debate is that their disagreement 
concerns the logical form of the propositions expressed by reasons ascriptions. In 
other words, the point would be that, say, while the realist takes an utterance like 
“The fact that you need help is a reason for me to help you” at face value, the con-
structivist believes that the proposition expressed by this reasons ascription is re-
ally something like The fact that you need help is a reason for me to help you rel-
ative to my normative point of view. Street (manuscript, § 7) thinks that this way 
to view the debate is misguided and that the disagreement between constructivists 
and realists is really one about the way the propositions in question should be 
evaluated.
12, 13
 The realist and the constructivist can agree that, say, an utterance 
of “The fact that you need help is a reason for me to help you” expresses the 
proposition The fact that you need help is a reason for me to help you; their disa-
greement lies in the fact that, unlike the realist, the constructivist believes that in 
order to assign a truth value to this proposition we must specify what is the rele-
vant normative point of view – in Kaplan’s (1989) terminology, they agree about 
the content but they disagree about the form of the relevant circumstances of 
evaluation. 
Following MacFarlane (2014, p. 62) I will call this kind of disagreement a 
“postsemantic” disagreement. Now, if the disagreement between constructivists 
and realists is a postsemantic one, constructivism has to be a postsemantic thesis, 
a thesis about the way certain propositions should be evaluated. Why then does 
Street think that constructivism is a judgment about practical reasons? As far as I 
can see, she has two different sets of reasons (see Street manuscript, § 8). First, 
the truth of constructivism (the postsemantic thesis that in order to assign a truth 
value to a proposition about practical reasons we must specify the relevant norma-
tive point of view) entails that of: 
 
The C-Thesis: there are no absolute reasons, only relative ones. 
 
                                                          
12
 Her terminology is different from mine: she says that the concept of a normative reason 
is neutral on the debate between realism and constructivism. I take this to be only a termi-
nological difference. 
13
 Note that Street also agrees with a realist like Scanlon (see, e.g., 2014) that reasons are 
just facts: it was the fact that the chocolate cookies I ate this morning were delicious 
which was a reason for me to eat them all. The disagreement between constructivists and 
realists, therefore, is not one concerning what kind of things reasons are either, at least in 
Street’s view. 
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And the C-Thesis seems to deserve to be called “a judgment about practical rea-
sons”. Second, the truth of constructivism affects the truth value of propositions 
which are clearly judgments about practical reasons. For example, if (Humean) 
constructivism is true, then it is true also that an ideally coherent Caligula has 
conclusive reasons to torture others for fun. 
Is this enough to say that constructivism is a judgment about practical reasons 
and make our argument sound? I think not. As for the first point, I agree that if the 
C-Thesis really deserved to be called “a judgment about practical reasons”, con-
structivism would be a judgment about practical reasons, too. After all, construc-
tivism and the C-Thesis say basically the same thing. The only difference is that 
while the first focuses on propositions, the second focuses on the corresponding 
facts. The problem is that the C-Thesis is not really a judgment about practical 
reasons, or better: it is not a judgment about practical reasons in the sense relevant 
to the argument we are discussing. The relevant sense is that at issue in the first 
premise – if “judgment about practical reasons” were not used in the same sense 
throughout it, the argument would be invalid. And in that premise a judgment 
about practical reasons is a judgment about the reasons a given agent has, a judg-
ment about what that agent should do – the judgments about practical reasons 
mentioned there are the judgments object of constructivism about practical rea-
sons, and the object of constructivism about practical reasons are judgments about 
the reasons a given agent has. And this is just not the logical form of the C-Thesis. 
What about the second point? Judgments like that an ideally coherent Caligula 
has conclusive reasons to torture others for fun are, of course, judgments about 
practical reasons in the relevant sense. But this, even taken together with the fact 
that the truth of constructivism affects the truth value of these propositions, does 
not mean that constructivism is a judgment about practical reasons – in the rele-
vant sense. Countless propositions which are not judgments about practical rea-
sons affect the truth value of judgments about practical reasons. I take it to be 
clear, for instance, that had I not liked chocolate I would not have had any reason 
to eat all those cookies this morning. 
I therefore think that if Street does not have other reasons to believe that con-
structivism is a judgment about what people should do (in the relevant sense), she 
should just regard our argument’s second premise as false and the argument itself 
as unsound.
14
 This seems to me to be the best answer to the triviality objection.
15
 
                                                          
14
 At one point, Street (manuscript, p. 15) comes close to rejecting the premise in ques-
tion: she says that the constructivist thesis does not, taken by itself, apply to itself. How-
ever, she then goes on to say that she regards the constructivist thesis as itself a substan-
tive normative claim about what reasons there are and that this entails that constructivism 
is true only relative to a normative point of view. I am not sure this is a consistent posi-
tion: if by “a substantive normative claim about what reasons there are” Street means a 
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judgment about what certain agents should do, then constructivism applies to itself; if 
not, I do not understand why constructivism should be thought to be true only relative to 
a normative point of view. That being said, it seems clear that Street does accept our ar-
gument’s second premise. 
15
 Note that the fact that our argument’s second premise is false gives us another route to 
the conclusion that the Kantian basis thesis is false: even if the Darwinian Dilemma were 
really sound relative to every possible normative point of view, the Kantian basis thesis 
would be false because constructivism is not a judgment about what people should do. 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019 
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